The relationship between the Bayesian approach and the minimum description length approach is established. We sharpen and clarify the general modeling principles MDL and MML, abstracted as the ideal MDL principle and defined from Bayes's rule by means of Kolmogorov complexity. The basic condition under which the ideal principle should be applied is encapsulated as the Fundamental Inequality, which in broad terms states that the principle is valid when the data are random, relative to every contemplated hypothesis and also these hypotheses are random relative to the (universal) prior. Basically, the ideal principle states that the prior probability associated with the hypothesis should be given by the algorithmic universal probability, and the sum of the log universal probability of the model plus the log of the probability of the data given the model should be minimized. If we restrict the model class to the finite sets then application of the ideal principle turns into Kolmogorov's minimal sufficient statistic. In general we show that data compression is almost always the best strategy, both in hypothesis identification and prediction.
Introduction
It is widely believed that the better a theory compresses the data concerning some phenomenon under investigation, the better we have learned, generalized, and the better the theory predicts unknown data. This belief is vindicated in practice and is a form of "Occam's razor" paradigm * Parts of the ideas in this paper were announced in: M. Li about "simplicity" but apparently has not been rigorously proved in a general setting. Here we show that data compression is almost always the best strategy, both in hypotheses identification by using an ideal form of the minimum description length (MDL) principle and in prediction of sequences. To demonstrate these benificial aspects of compression we use the Kolmogorov theory of complexity [12] to express the optimal effective compression. We identify precisely the situations in which MDL and Bayesianism coincide and where they differ.
Hypothesis identification To demonstrate that compression is good for hypothesis identification we use the ideal MDL principle defined from Bayes's rule by means of Kolmogorov complexity, Section 2. This transformation is valid only for individually random objects in computable distributions; if the contemplated objects are nonrandom or the distributions are not computable then MDL and Bayes's rule may part company. Basing MDL on first principles we probe below the customary presentation of MDL as being justified in and of itself by philosophical persuasion [21, 22] . The minimum message length (MML) approach, while relying on priors, in practice is a related approach [31, 32] . Such approaches balance the complexity of the model (and its tendency for overfitting) against the preciseness of fitting the data (the error of the hypothesis). Our analysis gives evidence why in practice Bayesianism is prone to overfitting and MDL isn't.
Ideal MDL We are only interested in the following common idea shared between all MDL-like methods: "Select the hypothesis which minimizes the sum of the length of the description of the hypothesis (also called "model") and the length of the description of the data relative to the hypothesis." We take this to mean that every contemplated individual hypothesis and every contemplated individual data sample is to be maximally compressed: the description lengths involved should be the shortest effective description lengths. We use "effective" in the sense of "Turing computable," [28] . Shortest effective description length is asymptotically unique and objective and known as the Kolmogorov complexity [12] of the object being described. Thus, "ideal MDL" is a Kolmogorov complexity based form of the minimum description length principle. In order to define ideal MDL from Bayes's rule we require some deep results due to L.A. Levin [16] and P. Gács [10] based on the novel notion of individual randomness of objects as expressed by P. Martin-Löf's randomness tests [18] . We show that the principle is valid when a basic condition encapsulated as the "Fundamental Inequality" (10) in Section 2 is satisfied. Broadly speaking this happens when the data are random, relative to each contemplated hypothesis, and also these hypotheses are random relative to the contemplated prior. The latter requirement is always satisfied for the so-called "universal" prior. Under those conditions ideal MDL, Bayesianism, MDL, and MML, select pretty much the same hypothesis. Theorem 4 states that minimum description length reasoning using shortest effective descriptions coincides with Bayesian reasoning using the universal prior distribution [16, 9, 6] , provided the minimum description length is achieved for those hypotheses with respect to which the data sample is individually random (in the sense of Martin-Löf). If we restrict the model class to finite sets then this procedure specializes to Kolmogorov's minimal sufficient statistics, [5, 17] .
Kolmogorov complexity We recapitulate the basic definitions in Appendix A in order to establish notation. Shortest effective descriptions are "effective" in the sense that we can compute the described objects from them. Unfortunately, [12, 34] , there is no general method to compute the length of a shortest description (the Kolmogorov complexity) from the object being described. This obviously impedes actual use. Instead, one needs to consider recursive approximations to shortest descriptions, for example by restricting the allowable approximation time. This course is followed in one sense or another in the practical incarnations such as MML and MDL. There one often uses simply the Shannon-Fano code, which assigns prefix code length l x := − log P (x) to x irrespective of the regularities in x. If P (x) = 2 −lx for every x ∈ {0, 1} n , then the code word length of an all-zero x equals the code word length of a truly irregular x. While the Shannon-Fano code gives an expected code word length close to the entropy, it does not distinguish the regular elements of a probability ensemble from the random ones.
Universal probability distribution Just as the Kolmogorov complexity measures the shortest effective description length of an object, the universal probability measures the greatest effective probability. Both notions are objective and absolute in the sense of being recursively invariant by Church's thesis, [17] . We give definitions in Appendix B. We use universal probability as a universal prior in Bayes' s rule to analyze ideal MDL.
Martin-Löf randomness The common meaning of a "random object" is an outcome of a random source. Such outcomes have expected properties but particular outcomes may or may not possess these expected properties. In contrast, we use the notion of randomness of individual objects. This elusive notion's long history goes back to the initial attempts by von Mises, [29] , to formulate the principles of application of the calculus of probabilities to real-world phenomena. Classical probability theory cannot even express the notion of "randomness of individual objects." Following almost half a century of unsuccessful attempts, the theory of Kolmogorov complexity, [12] , and Martin-Löf tests for randomness, [18] , finally succeeded in formally expressing the novel notion of individual randomness in a correct manner, see [17] . Every individually random object possesses individually all effectively testable properties that are only expected for outcomes of the random source concerned. It will satisfy all effective tests for randomness-known and unknown alike. In Appendix C we recapitulate the basics.
Two-part codes
The prefix-code of the shortest effective descriptions gives an expected code word length close to the entropy and also compresses the regular objects until all regularity is squeezed out. All shortest effective descriptions are completely random themselves, without any regularity whatsoever. The MDL idea of a two-part code for a body of data D is natural from the perspective of Kolmogorov complexity. If D does not contain any regularities at all, then it consists of purely random data and the hypothesis is precisely that. Assume that the body of data D contains regularities. With help of a description of those regularities (a model) we can describe the data compactly. Assuming that the regularities can be represented in an effective manner (that is, by a Turing machine), we encode the data as a program for that machine. Squeezing all effective regularity out of the data, we end up with a Turing machine representing the meaningful regular information in the data together with a program for that Turing machine representing the remaining meaningless randomness of the data. This intuition finds its basis in the Definitions 8 and 9 in Appendix A. However, in general there are many ways to make the division into meaningful information and remaining random information. In a painting the represented image, the brush strokes, or even finer detail can be the relevant information, depending on what we are interested in. What we require is a rigorous mathematical condition to force a sensible division of the information at hand in a meaningful part and a meaningless part. One way to do this in a restricted setting where the hypotheses are finite sets was suggested by Kolmogorov at a Tallin conference in 1973 and published in [13] . See [5, 17] and Section 2.1. Given data D, the goal is to identify the "most likely" finite set A of which D is a "typical" element. For this purpose we consider sets A such that D ∈ A and we represent A by the shortest program A * that computes the characteristic function of A. The Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic is the shortest A * , say A * 0 associated with the set A 0 , over all A containing D such that the two-part description consisting of A * 0 and log d(A 0 ) is as as short as the shortest single program that computes D without input. This definition is non-vacuous since there is a two-part code (based on hypothesis A D = {D}) that is as concise as the shortest single code.
The shortest two-part code must be at least as long as the shortest one-part code. Therefore, the description of D given A * 0 cannot be significantly shorter than log d(A 0 ). By the theory of Martin-Löf randomness in Appendix C this means that D is a "typical" element of A. The ideal MDL principle expounded in this paper is essentially a generalization of the Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic.
Note that in general finding a minimal sufficient statistic is not recursive. Similarly, even computing the MDL optimum in a much more restricted class of models may run in computation difficulties since it involves finding an optimum in a large set of candidates. In some cases one can approximate this optimum, [30, 33] .
Prediction The best single hypothesis does not necessarily give the best prediction. For example, consider a situation where we are given a coin of unknown bias p of coming up "heads" which is either
. Suppose we have determined that there is probability 2 3 that p = p 1 and probability 1 3 that p = p 2 . Then the "best" hypothesis is the most likely one: p = p 1 which predicts a next outcome "heads" as having probability 3 . Yet the best prediction is that this probability is the expectation of throwing "heads" which is
Thus, the fact that compression is good for hypothesis identification problems does not imply that compression is good for prediction. In Section 3 we analyze the relation between compression of the data sample and prediction in the very general setting of R. Solomonoff [25, 26] . We explain Solomonoff's prediction method using the universal distribution. We show that this method is not equivalent to the use of shortest descriptions. Nonetheless, we demonstrate that compression of descriptions almost always gives optimal prediction.
Scientific inference The philosopher D. Hume (1711-1776) argued [11] that true induction is impossible because we can only reach conclusions by using known data and methods. Therefore, the conclusion is logically already contained in the start configuration. Consequently, the only form of induction possible is deduction. Philosophers have tried to find a way out of this deterministic conundrum by appealing to probabilistic reasoning such as using Bayes's rule [2] . One problem with this is where the "prior probability" one uses has to come from. Unsatisfactory solutions have been proposed by philosophers like R. Carnap [4] and K. Popper [20] .
Essentially, combining the ideas of Epicurus, Ockham, Bayes, and modern computability theory, Solomonoff [25, 26] has successfully invented a "perfect" theory of induction. It incorporates Epicurus's multiple explanations idea, [1] , since no hypothesis that is still consistent with the data will be eliminated. It incorporates Ockham's simplest explanation idea since the hypotheses with low Kolmogorov complexity are more probable. The inductive reasoning is performed by means of the mathematically sound rule of Bayes.
Comparison with Related Work Kolmogorov's minimal sufficient statistics deals with hypothesis selection where the considered hypotheses are finite sets of bounded cardinality. Ideal MDL hypothesis selection generalizes this procedure to arbitrary settings. It is satisfying that our findings on ideal MDL confirm the validity of the "real" MDL principle which rests on the idea of stochastic complexity. The latter is defined in such a way that it represents the shortest code length only for almost all data samples (stochastically speaking the "typical" ones) for all models with real parameters in certain classes of probabilistic models except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, [22, 7, 19] . Similar results concerning probability density estimation by MDL are given in [3] . These references consider probabilistic models and conditions. We believe that in many current situations the models are inherently non-probabilistic as, for example, in the transmission of compressed images over noisy channels, [27] . Our algorithmic analysis of ideal MDL is about such non-probabilistic model settings as well as probabilistic ones (provided they are recursive). The results are derived in a nonprobabilistic manner entirely different from the cited papers. It is remarkable that there is a close agreement between the real properly articulated MDL principle and our ideal one. The ideal MDL principle is valid in case the data is individually random with respect to the contemplated hypothesis and the latter is an individually random element of the contemplated prior. Individually random objects are in a rigorous formal sense "typical" objects in a probability ensemble and together they constitute allmost all such objects (all objects except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the continuous case). The nonprobabilistic expression of the range of validity of "ideal MDL." implies the probabilistic expressions of the range of validity of the "real MDL" principle.
Our results are more precise than the earlier probabilistic ones in that they explicitly identify the "excepted set of Lebesgue measure zero" for which the principle may not be valid as the set of "individually nonrandom elements." The principle selects models such that the presented data are individually random with respect to these models: if there is a true model and the data are not random with respect to it then the principle avoids this model. This leads to a mathematical explanation of correspondences and differences between ideal MDL and Bayesian reasoning, and in particular it gives some evidence under what conditions the latter is prone to overfitting while the former isn't.
Ideal MDL
The idea of predicting sequences using shortest effective descriptions was first formulated by R. Solomonoff, [25] . He uses Bayes's formula equipped with a fixed "universal" prior distribution. In accordance with Occam's dictum, that distribution gives most weight to the explanation that compresses the data the most. This approach inspired Rissanen [21, 22] We focus only on the following central ideal version which we believe is the essence of the matter. Indeed, we do not even care about whether we deal with statistical or deterministic hypotheses. Under certain conditions on what constitutes a "model" and the notion of "encoding given the model" this coincides with Kolmogorov's minimal sufficient statistic in Section 2.1. In the latter a "model" is constrained to be a program that enumerates a finite set of data candidates that includes the data at hand. Additionally, the "effective description of the data when encoded given the model" is replaced by the logarithm of the number of elements in the set that constitutes the model. In ideal MDL we deal with model classes that may not be finite sets, like the set of context-free languages or the set of recursive probability density functions. Therefore we require a more general approach.
Intuitively, a more complex hypothesis H may fit the data better and therefore decreases the misclassified data. If H describes all the data, then it does not allow for measuring errors. A simpler description of H may be penalized by increasing the number of misclassified data. If H is a trivial hypothesis that contains nothing, then all data are described literally and there is no generalization. The rationale of the method is that a balance in between seems to be required.
To derive the MDL approach we start from Bayes's rule written as
If the hypotheses space H is countable and the hypotheses H are exhausive and mutually exclusive, then H∈H P (H) = 1 Pr(D) = H∈H Pr(D|H)P (H). For clarity and because it is relevant for the sequel we distinguish notationally between the given prior probability "P (·)" and the probabilities "Pr(·)" that are induced by P (·) and the hypotheses H. Bayes's rule maps input (P (H), D) to output Pr(H|D)-the posterior probability. For many model classes (Bernoulli processes, Markov chains), as the number n of data generated by a true model in the class increases the total inferred probability can be expected to concentrate on the 'true' hypothesis (with probability one for n → ∞). That is, as n grows the weight of the factor Pr(D|H)/ Pr(D) dominates the influence of the prior P (·) for typical data-by the law of large numbers. The importance of Bayes's rule is that the inferred probability gives us as much information as possible about the possible hypotheses from only a small number of (typical) data and the prior probability. In general we don't know the prior probabilities. The MDL approach in a sense replaces the unknown prior probability that depends on the phenomenon being investigated by a fixed probability that depends on the coding used to encode the hypotheses. In ideal MDL the fixed "universal" probability (Appendix B) is based on Kolmogorov complexity-the length of the shortest effective code (Appendix A).
In Bayes's rule we are concerned with maximizing the term Pr(H|D) over H. Taking the negative logarithm at both sides of the equation, this is equivalent to minimizing the expression − log Pr(H|D) over H:
Since the probability Pr(D) is constant under varying H, we want to find an H 0 such that
In MML as in [32] or MDL as in [22] one roughly interprets these negative logarithms of probabilities as the corresponding Shannon-Fano code word lengths. 1 But why not use the shortest effective descriptions with code word length set equal to the Kolmogorov complexities? This has an expected code word length about equal to the entropy, [17] , but additionally it compresses each object by effectively squeezing out and accounting for all regularities in it. The resulting code word is maximally random, that is, it has maximal Kolmogorov complexity. 2 Under certain constraints to be determined later, the probabilities involved in (2) can be substituted by the corresponding universal probabilities m(·) (Appendix B):
log Pr(D|H) := log m(D|H).
According to [16, 9, 6] we can then substitute
where K(·) is the prefix complexity of Appendix A. This way we replace the sum of (2) by the sum of the minimum lengths of effective self-delimiting programs that compute descriptions of H and D|H. The result is the code-independent, recursively invariant, absolute form of the MDL principle:
Definition 2 Given an hypothesis class H and a data sample D, the ideal MDL principle selects the hypothesis
If there is more than one H that minimizes (5) then we break the tie by selecting the one of least complexity K(H).
The key question of Bayesianism versus ideal MDL is: When is the substitution (3) valid? We show that in a simple setting were the hypotheses are finite sets the ideal MDL principle and Bayesianism using the universal prior m(x) coincide with each other and with the Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic. We generalize this to probabilistic hypothesis classes. In full generality however, ideal MDL and Bayesianism may diverge due to the distinction between the − log P (·) (the Shannon-Fano code length) and the Kolmogorov complexity K(·) (the shortest effective code length). We establish the Fundamental Inequality defining the range of coincidence of the two principles.
From now on, we will denote by 
Kolmogorov Minimal Sufficient Statistic
Considering only hypotheses that are finite sets of binary strings of finite lengths the hypothesis selection principle known as "Kolmogorov's minimal sufficient statistic" [13] has a crisp formulation in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. For this restricted hypothesis class we show that the Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic is actually Bayesian hypothesis selection using the universal distribution m(·) as prior distribution and it also coincides with the ideal MDL principle.
We follow the treatment of [5, 17] using prefix complexity instead of plain complexity. Let k and δ be natural numbers. A binary string D representing a data sample is called (k, δ)-stochastic if there is a finite set H ⊆ {0, 1} * and D ∈ H such that
The first inequality (with k not too large) means that H is sufficiently simple. The second inequality (with the randomness deficiency δ not too large) means that D is an undistinguished (typical) element of H. Indeed, if D had properties defining a very small subset H ′ of H, then these could be used to obtain a simple description of D by determining its ordinal number in H ′ , which would require log d(H ′ ) bits, which is much less than log d(H).
Suppose we carry out some probabilistic experiment of which the outcome can be a priori every natural number. Suppose this number is D. Knowing D, we want to recover the probability distribution P on the set of natural numbers N . It seems reasonable to require that first, P has a simple description, and second, that D would be a "typical" outcome of an experiment with probability distribution P -that is, D is maximally random with respect to P . The analysis above addresses a simplified form of this issue where H plays the part of P -for example, H is a finite set of high-probability elements. In n tosses of a coin with probability p > 0 of coming up "heads," the set H of outcomes consisting of binary strings of length n with n/2 1's constitutes a set of
2 log n bits. To describe H ⊆ {0, 1} n given n requires O(1) bits (that is, k is small in (6) below). Conditioning everything on the length n, we have
and for the overwhelming majority of the D's in H,
For a given small constant c, let k 0 be the least k such that
Let H 0 be the corresponding set, and let H * 0 be its shortest program. This k 0 with K(H 0 |n) ≤ k 0 is the least k for which the two-part description of D is as parsimonious as the best single part description of D.
For this approach to be meaningful we need to show that there always exists a k satisfying (6). For example, consider the hypothesis
which shows that setting k :
If D is maximally complex in some set H 0 , then H 0 represents all non-accidental structure in D. The K k 0 (D|n)-stage of the description just provides an index for x in H 0 -essentially the description of the randomness or accidental structure of the string.
Call a program H * a sufficient statistics if the complexity K(D|H, n) attains its maximum value + = log d(H) and the randomness deficiency δ(D|H) = log d(H) − K(D|H, n) is minimal.
Definition 3 Let H := {H : H ⊆ {0, 1} n } and D ∈ {0, 1} n . Define
The set H 0 -rather the shortest program H * 0 that prints out the characteristic sequence of H 0 ∈ {0, 1} n -is called the Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic (KMSS) for D, given n. (
All programs describing sets H with
K(H|n) ≤ k 0 such that K k 0 (D|n) + k 0 + = K(D|n)
i) Bayes's rule to select the least complexity hypothesis among the hypotheses of maximal a posterior probability using both (a) the universal distribution m(·) as prior distribution, and (b) Pr(D|H) is the uniform probability 1/d(H) for D ∈ H and 0 otherwise;
(ii) Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic; and
Proof. (i) ↔ (ii). Substitute probabilities as in the statement of the theorem in (2).
(ii) ↔ (iii). Let H 0 be the Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic for D so that (7) holds. In addition, it is straightforward that K(
which is what we had to prove. 2
Example 1 Let us look at a coin toss example. If the probability p of tossing "1" is unknown, then we can give a two-part description of a string D representing the sequence of n outcomes by describing the number k of 1's in D first, followed by the index j ≤ d(H) of D in in the set H of strings with k 1's. In this way "k|n" functions as the model. If k is incompressible with K(k|n) + = log n and K(j|k, n) + = log n k then the Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic is described by k|n in log n bits. However if p is a simple value like 1 2 (or 1/π), then with overwhelming probability we obtain a much simpler Kolmogorov minimal sufficient characteristic by a description
Probabilistic Generalization of KMSS
Comparison of (2), (7), and Theorem 1 suggests a more general probabilistic version of Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic. This version turns out to coincide with maximum a posteriori Bayesian inference but not necessarily with ideal MDL without additional conditions.
Definition 4
Let H be an enumerable class of probabilistic hypotheses and D be an enumerable domain of data samples such that for every H ∈ H the probability density function Pr(·|H) over the domain of data samples is recursive. Assume furthermore that for every data sample D in the domain there is an H D ∈ H such that Pr(D|H D ) = 1 and K(D|H D ) + = 0 (the hypothesis forces the data sample). Define
The set H 0 -rather the shortest program H * 0 that prints out the characteristic sequence of H 0 ∈ {0, 1} n -is called the generalized Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic (GKMSS) for D.
The requirement that for every data sample in the domain there is an hypothesis that forces it ensures that H 0 as in definition 4 exists. 3 4 Theorem 2 The least complexity maximum a posteriori probability hypothesis H 0 in Bayes's rule using prior P (H) := m(H) coincides with the generalized Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic. (2) . Using (4) the least complexity hypothesis satisfying the optimization problem is:
By assumptions in definition 4 there is an
It is straightforward that
is the code length of the effective Shannon-Fano prefix code (see Section 2.3 or [5, 17] ) to recover D given H. Since the prefix complexity is the length of the shortest effective prefix code we have − log Pr(D|H)
Shannon-Fano Code, Shortest Programs, and Randomness
There is a tight connection between prefix codes, probabilities, and notions of optimal codes. The Shannon-Fano prefix code [5] for an ensemble of source words with probability density q has code word length l q (x) := − log q(x) (up to rounding) for source word x. This code satisfies
where H(q) is the entropy of q. By the Noiseless Coding Theorem this is the least expected code word length among all prefix codes. Therefore, the hypothesis H which minimizes (2) written as
minimizes the sum of two prefix codes that both have shortest expected code-word lengths. This is more or less what MML [32] and MDL [22] do. But there are many prefix codes that have expected code word length almost equal to the entropy. Consider only the class of prefix codes that can be decoded by Turing machines (other codes are not practical). There is is an optimal code in that class with code word length K(x) for object x. "Optimality" means that for every prefix code in the class there is a constant c such that for all x the length of the code for x is at least K(x) − c, see Appendix A or [17] .
In ideal MDL we minimize the sum of the effective description lengths of the individual elements H, D involved as in (5) . This is validated by Bayes's rule provided (3) holds. To satisfy one part of (3) we are free to make the new assumption that the prior probability P (·) in Bayes's rule (1) is fixed as m(·). However, with respect to the other part of (3) we cannot assume that the probability Pr(·|H) equals m(·|H). Namely, probability Pr(·|H) may be totally determined by the hypothesis H. Depending on H therefore, l Pr(·|H) (D) may be very different from K(D|H). This holds especially for 'simple' data D which have low probability under assumption of hypothesis H.
Example 2 Suppose we flip a coin of unknown bias n times. Let hypothesis H and data D be defined by:
Then we have Pr(D|H) = 1/2 n and l Pr(·|H) (D) = − log Pr(D|H) = n.
In contrast,
K(D|H)
+ < log n + 2 log log n.
3
The question arises exactly when is − log P (x)
This is answered by the theory of individual randomness. Let P : {0, 1} * → [0, 1] be a recursive probability density function. 5 By Theorem 11 (Appendix C) an element x is Martin-Löf random iff the universal test log(m(x)/P (x)) ≤ 0. That is, − log m(x) ≥ − log P (x). 6 
The Fundamental Inequality
Let us call an hypothesis class H rich enough if it contains a trivial hypothesis H Ø satisfying K(H Ø ) + = 0 and satisfies the assumptions of definition 4. In ideal MDL as applied to such a rich enough hypothesis class H there are two boundary cases: The trivial hypothesis H Ø with K(H Ø )
, these hypotheses minimize the ideal MDL description.
But for trivial hypotheses only Kolmogorov random data are typical. In fact, ideal MDL correctly selects the trivial hypothesis for individually random data. But in general "meaningful" data are "nonrandom" in the sense that K(D) ≪ l(D). But then D is typical only for nontrivial hypotheses, and a trivial hypothesis selected by ideal MDL is not one for which the data are typical. We need to identify the conditions under which ideal MDL restricts itself to selection among hypotheses for which the given data are typical-it performs as the generalized Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic.
Note that hypotheses satisfying (8) may not always exist if we don't require that every data sample in the domain is forced by some hypothesis in the hypothesis space we consider, as we did in definition 4.
Example 3
We look at a situation where the three optimization principles (2), (5), (8) act differently. Consider the outcome of n trials of a Bernoulli process (p, 1 − p). There are two hypotheses H = {H 0 , H 1 } where
The prior P is P (H 0 ) = . Consider the data sample D = 0 n with n Kolmogorov random (also with respect to H 0 and H 1 ) so that log n ≤ K(D), K(D|H 0 ), K(D|H 1 ) ≤ log n + 2 log log n. Now
Therefore Bayesianism selects H 1 which is intuitively correct. Both hypotheses have complexity + = 0. Therefore we can substitute − log P (H) := K(H) to obtain
Now generalized Kolmogorov minimal statistic doesn't select any hypothesis at all because the right-hand side is unequal K(D). Ideal MDL on the other hand has the ex equo choice
which intuitively seems incorrect. So we need to identify the conditions under which ideal MDL draws correct conclusions.
3
While we can set the prior P (·) := m(·) in Bayes's rule to obtain the generalized Kolmogorov minimal sufficient statistic for a rich enough hypothesis class, we cannot in general also set − log Pr(D|H 0 ) := K(D|H 0 ) to obtain ideal MDL. The theory dealing with randomness of individual objects states the conditions for − log Pr(D|H) and K(D|H) to be close: 7
• Data sample D is "typical" for H ∈ H iff − log Pr(D|H)
Below we need the following:
Definition 5 Let P : N → [0, 1] be a recursive probability density distribution. Then, the prefix complexity K(P ) of P is defined as the length of the shortest self-delimiting program for the reference universal prefix machine to simulate the Turing machine computing the probability density function P : it is the shortest effective self-delimiting description of P , (Appendix A).
The relation between Bayes's rule and ideal MDL governed by the following:
Theorem 3 (Fundamental Inequality) Let Pr(·|·) and P (·) be recursive probability density functions.
(
≤ − log Pr(D|H) − log P (H)
(ii) If − log Pr(D|H) − log P (H)
Proof. We appeal to the following known facts, Appendix C. Because Pr(·|H) is recursive: (25) . Therefore,
Note that K(Pr(·|H)) + < K(H) because from H we can compute Pr(·|H) by assumption on Pr(·|·). Secondly, if D is a Martin-Löf random element of the distribution Pr(·|H), then by Theorem 11:
For D's that are Martin-Löf random, (12, 13) mean by (3) that (11) holds.
2
If we set the a priori probability P (H) of hypothesis H to the universal probability then we obtain directly − log P (H) = m(x). However, we do not need to make this assumption. For a recursive prior P (·), we can analyze the situation when H is random with respect to P (·).
Claim 2 If H is a Martin-Löf random element of P (·) then
Proof. Analogous to the proof of (11). 2
Together (11, 14) yield the theorem, part (i).
(ii) Follows from (14), (1). 2
Remark 1
We would like the theorem to hold for the overwhelming majority of (data,hypothesis)-pairs. It can be shown that a fixed fraction of all objects of every length are random according to the universal randomness test for finite objects (Theorem 11, Appendix C). In the sample space of infinite binary sequences a related randomness test shows infinite binary sequences are random with probability one (Lemma 1, Section 3). We would like to state that almost all finite objects are random for all recursive distributions. Although this is the case for many probability distributions (for example m(·)) we can ensure it for all probability distributions by relaxing the randomness condition. Clearly, for finite sequences randomness viewed as absence of regularities is a matter of degree: it doesn't make sense to say that x is random and x with the first bit flipped is non-random. Relaxing the arbitrary dividing line we call finite x's of length n say weakly random if − log m(x) ≥ − log P (x) − log n. This is more in line with Martin-Löf's original universal randomness test for finite binary strings which are a little weaker than log(m(x)/P (x)) ≤ 0 (Lemma 4, Appendix C). Now
for some constant ǫ > 0. The last inequality (Lemma 4.3.2 in [17] ) is essentially due to the halting problem. By Markov's inequality (Appendix C) with overwhelming P -probability (> 1 − 1/n) an x ∈ {0, 1} * is weakly random.
If we relax our notion of individual randomness to say weak randomness then at least a fraction of 1 − 1/n of all binary strings of length n is weakly random. This may cause an increase of α(P, H) by an additive logarithmic term (logarithmic in the length of P and H).
Remark 2 (Range of Validity of FI) Hypothesis H is P -random means that H is "typical" for the prior distribution P (·) in the sense that it must not belong to any effective minority (sets on which a minority of P -probability is concentrated). That is, hypothesis H does not have any effectively testable properties that distinguish it from a majority. In [17] it is shown that this is the set of H's such that K(H) + = − log P (H). In case P (H) = m(H), that is, the prior distribution equals the universal distribution, then for all H we have K(H)
, that is, all hypotheses are random with respect to the universal distribution.
For other prior distributions some hypotheses are random, and some other hypotheses are nonrandom. Let the possible hypotheses correspond to the binary strings of length n, and let P n be the uniform distribution that assigns probability P n (H) = 1/2 n to every hypothesis H. Let us assume that the hypotheses are coded as binary strings of length n, so that H ∈ {0, 1} n . Then, H := 00 . . . 0 has low complexity: K(H|n) + < log n. However, − log P n (H) = n. Therefore, by (14) , H is not P n -random. If we obtain H by n flips of a fair coin however, then with overwhelming probability we will have that K(H|n) + = n and therefore − log P n (H) + = K(H|n) and H is P nrandom.
That data sample D is Pr(·|H)-random means that the data are random with respect to the probability distribution Pr(·|H) induced by the hypothesis H. Therefore, we require that the sample data D are 'typical', that is, 'randomly distributed' with respect to Pr(·|H).
3
Remark 3 (Optimal Hypothesis Doesn't Satisify FI) The only way to violate the Fundamental Inequality is that either D is not Pr(·|H)-random and therefore − log Pr(D|H) ≫ K(D|H), or that H is not P -random and therefore − log P (H) ≫ K(H). We give an example of the first case. 8 Consider the identification of a Bernoulli process B p = (p, 1 − p) (0 < p < 1) that generates a given data sample D ∈ {0, 1} n . Let Pr(D|B p , n) denote the distribution of the outcome D of n trials of the process B p . If the data D are "atypical" like D = 00 . . . 0 (n failures) for p = 1 2 and n large, then it violates the Pr(·|B 1/2 , n)-randomness test (13) by having − log Pr(D|B 1/2 ) = n and K(D|B 1/2 ) + < log n + 2 log log n.
Let the true hypothesis is B 0 . The data sample D = 00 . . . 0 is Martin-Löf random with respect to B 0 . In fact, for every p the data sample generated by B p is with overwhelming likelihood MartinLöf random with respect to B p . For such data samples, if furthermore the prior probability P (·) := m(·), then the Fundamental Inequality holds. If in fact B 1/2 would have been the true hypothesis and we have obtained the same data D = 00 . . . 0 (n zeros) as before, then the Fundamental Inequality is violated for this true hypothesis and with an appropriate prior Bayes's rule selects B 1/2 while MDL selects B 0 . 3
Ideal MDL and Bayesianism
The best model or hypothesis to explain the data is one that is a "typical" element of the prior distribution and the data are "typical" for the contemplated hypothesis-as prescribed by Kolmogorov's minimum sufficient statistics. Thus, it is reasonable to contemplate only admissible hypotheses as defined below in selecting the best one. 
Proof. If in the Fundamental Inequality α(P, H) is small then this means that both the prior distribution P is simple, and that the probability distribution Pr(·|H) over the data samples induced by hypothesis H is simple. In contrast, if α(P, H) is large, which means that either of the mentioned distributions is not simple, for example when K(Pr(·|H)) = K(H) for complex H, then there may be some discrepancy. Namely, in Bayes's rule our purpose is to maximize Pr(H|D), and the hypothesis H that minimizes K(D|H) + K(H) also maximizes Pr(H|D) up to a 2 −α(P,H) multiplicative factor. Conversely, the H that maximizes Pr(H|D) also minimizes K(D|H) + K(H) up to an additive term α(P, H). That is, with
we obtain (15) from (10). 2
As a consequence, if α(P, H) is small enough and Bayes's rule selects an admissible hypothesis, and so does ideal MDL, then both criteria are (approximately) optimized by both selected hypotheses.
In order to identify application of MDL with application of Bayes's rule on some prior distribution P as in Theorem 4 we must assume that, given D, the Fundamental Inequality is satisfied for H mdl as defined in (16) . This means that H mdl is P -random for the used prior distribution P . One choice to guarantee this is
This is a valid choice even though m is not recursive. Namely, we only require that m(·)/P (·) be enumerable (Definition 10, Appendix B), which is certainly guaranteed by choice of P (·) := m(·). The choice of m(·) as prior is an objective and recursively invariant Occam's razor: simple hypothesis H (with K(H) ≪ l(H) have high m-probability, and complex or random hypothesis H (with K(H) ≈ l(H)) have low m-probability 2 −l(H) . The randomness test log(m(H)/P (H)) evaluates to 0 for every H, which means that all hypotheses are random with respect to distribution m(·). Proof. With α(P, H) + = 0 and P (·) := m(·) (so − log P (H) = K(H) by (4)) we can rewrite (10) as − log Pr(D|H)
The theorem follows by Theorem 11 in Appendix C. 2
If there is a true probabilistic model H then with high probability the data sample D will be Pr(·|H)-random. This suggests that in selecting the best model we should contemplate only those models H for which this is the case. The requirement that D be Pr(·|H mdl )-random constrains the domain of hypotheses from which we can choose H mdl .
Corollary 1
With high probability ideal MDL is an application of Bayes's rule with the universal prior distribution m(·) and selection of an optimal admissible hypothesis H mdl such that the data sample D is Pr(·|H mdl )-random (in the sense of Appendix C).
Since the notion of individual randomness incorporates all effectively testable properties of randomness (in the finite case only to some degree), application of ideal MDL will select the simplest hypothesis H that balances K(D|H) and K(H) such that the data sample D is random to it-as far as can effectively be ascertained.
Restricted to the class of admissible hypotheses, ideal MDL does not simply select the hypothesis that precisely fits the data but it selects an hypothesis that would typically generate the data. With some amount of overstatement one can say that if one obtains perfect data for a true hypothesis, then ideal MDL interprets these data as data obtained from a simpler hypothesis subject to measuring errors. Consequently, in this case ideal MDL is going to give you the false simple hypothesis and not the complex true hypothesis.
• Ideal MDL only gives us the true hypothesis if the data satisfies certain conditions relative to the true hypothesis. Stated differently: there are only data and no true hypothesis for ideal MDL. The principle simply obtains the hypothesis suggested by the data and it assumes that the data are random with respect to the hypothesis.
Applications
Unfortunately, the function K is not computable, [17] . For practical applications one must settle for easily computable approximations, for example, restricted model classes and particular codings of hypotheses. In this paper we will not address the question which encoding one uses in practice, but refer to references [22, 31, 33, 30] . In statistical applications, H is some statistical distribution (or model) H = P (θ) with a list of parameters θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ k ), where the number k may vary and influence the (descriptional) complexity of θ. (For example, H can be a normal distribution N (µ, σ) described by θ = (µ, σ).) Each parameter θ i is truncated to fixed finite precision. The data sample consists of n outcomes y = (y 1 , . . . , x n ) of n trials x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for distribution P (θ). The data D in the above formulas is given as D = (x, y). By expansion of conditional probabilities we have therefore Pr(D|H) = Pr(x, y|H) = Pr(x|H) · Pr(y|H, x).
In the argument above we take the negative logarithm of Pr(D|H), that is, − log Pr(D|H) = − log Pr(x|H) − log Pr(y|H, x).
Taking the negative logarithm in Bayes's rule and the analysis of the previous section now yields that MDL selects the hypothesis with highest inferred probability satisfying x is Pr(·|H)-random and y is Pr(·|H, x)-random. Bayesian reasoning selects the same hypothesis provided the hypothesis with maximal inferred probability has x, y satisfy the same conditions. Example 4 (Learning Polynomials) We wish to fit a polynomial f of unknown degree to a set of data points D such that it can predict future data y given x. Even if the data did come from a polynomial curve of degree, say two, because of measurement errors and noise, we still cannot find a polynomial of degree two fitting all n points exactly. In general, the higher the degree of fitting polynomial, the greater the precision of the fit. For n data points, a polynomial of degree n − 1 can be made to fit exactly, but probably has no predictive value. Applying ideal MDL we look for H mdl := minarg H {K(x, y|H) + K(H)}.
Let us apply the ideal MDL principle where we describe all (k − 1)-degree polynomials by a vector of k entries, each entry with a precision of d bits. Then, the entire polynomial is described by kd + O(log kd) bits.
(We have to describe k, d, and account for self-delimiting encoding of the separate items.) For example, ax 2 + bx + c is described by (a, b, c) and can be encoded by about 3d bits. Each datapoint (x i , y i ) which needs to be encoded separately with precision of d bits per coordinate costs about 2d bits. For simplicity assume that probability Pr(x|H) = 1 (because x is prescribed). To apply the ideal MDL principle we must trade the cost of hypothesis H (17) against the cost of describing y given H and x. As a trivial example, suppose n − 1 out of n datapoints fit a polynomial of degree 2 exactly, but only 2 points lie on any polynomial of degree 1 (a straight line). Of course, there is a polynomial of degree n − 1 which fits the data precisely (up to precision). Then the ideal MDL cost is 3d + 2d for the 2nd degree polynomial, 2d + (n − 2)d for the 1st degree polynomial, and nd for the (n − 1)th degree polynomial. Given the choice among those three options, we select the 2nd degree polynomial for all n > 5.
Remark 4 (Exception-Based MDL) A hypothesis H minimizing K(D|H) + K(H) always satisfies K(D|H) + K(H) ≥ K(D).
Let E ⊆ D denote the subset of the data that are exceptions to H in the sense of not being classified correctly by H. The following exception-based MDL (E-MDL) is sometimes confused with MDL: With E := D − D H and D H is the data set classified according to H, select
In E-MDL we look for the shortest description of an accepting program for the data consisting of a classification rule H and an exception list E. While this principle sometimes gives good results, application may lead to absurdity as the following shows: In many problems the data sample consists of positive examples only. For example, in learning (a grammar for) English language, given the Oxford English Dictionary. According to E-MDL the best hypothesis is the trivial grammar H generating all sentences over the alphabet. Namely, this grammar gives K(H) + = 0 independent of D and also E := Ø. Consequently,
which is absurd. The E-MDL principle is vindicated and reduces to standard MDL in the context of interpreting D = (x, y) with x fixed as in "supervised learning." Now for constant K(x|H)
is the same as
Ignoring the constant x in the conditional K(y|H, x) corresponds to K(E|H). 3
Prediction by Minimum Description Length
Let us consider theory formation in science as the process of obtaining a compact description of past observations together with predictions of future ones. Ray Solomonoff [25, 26] argues that the preliminary data of the investigator, the hypotheses he proposes, the experimental setup he designs, the trials he performs, the outcomes he obtains, the new hypotheses he formulates, and so on, can all be encoded as the initial segment of a potentially infinite binary sequence. The investigator obtains increasingly longer initial segments of an infinite binary sequence ω by performing more and more experiments on some aspect of nature. To describe the underlying regularity of ω, the investigator tries to formulate a theory that governs ω on the basis of the outcome of past experiments. Candidate theories (hypotheses) are identified with computer programs that compute binary sequences starting with the observed initial segment. There are many different possible infinite sequences (histories) on which the investigator can embark. The phenomenon he wants to understand or the strategy he uses can be stochastic. Each such sequence corresponds to one never-ending sequential history of conjectures and refutations and confirmations and each initial segment has different continuations governed by certain probabilities. In this view each phenomenon can be identified with a measure µ on the continuous sample space of infinite sequences over a basic description alphabet. This distribution µ can be said to be the concept or phenomenon involved. Now the aim is to predict outcomes concerning a phenomenon µ under investigation. In this case we have some prior evidence (prior distribution over the hypotheses, experimental data) and we want to predict future events.
This situation can be modelled by considering a sample space S of one-way infinite sequences of basic elements B defined by S = B ∞ . We assume a prior distribution µ over S with µ(x) denoting the probability of a sequence starting with x. Here µ(·) is a semimeasure 9 satisfying
Given a previously observed data string x, the inference problem is to predict the next symbol in the output sequence, that is, to extrapolate the sequence x. In terms of the variables in (1), H xy is the hypothesis that the sequence starts with initial segment xy. Data D x consists of the fact that the sequence starts with initial segment x. Then, Pr(D x |H xy ) = 1, that is, the data is forced by the hypothesis, or Pr(D z |H xy ) = 0 for z is not a prefix of xy, that is, the hypothesis contradicts the data. For P (H xy ) and Pr(D x ) in (1) we substitute µ(xy) and µ(x), respectively. For Pr(H xy |D x ) we substitute µ(y|x). This way (1) is rewritten as
The final probability µ(y|x) is the probability of the next symbol string being y, given the initial string x. Obviously we now only need the prior probability µ to evaluate µ(y|x). The goal of inductive inference in general is to be able to either (i) predict, or extrapolate, the next element after x or (ii) to infer an underlying effective process that generated x, and hence to be able to predict the next symbol. In the most general deterministic case such an effective process is a Turing machine, but it can also be a probabilistic Turing machine or, say, a Markov process. The central task of inductive inference is to find a universally valid approximation to µ which is good at estimating the conditional probability that a given segment x will be followed by a segment y. In general this is impossible. But suppose we restrict the class of priors µ to the recursive semimeasures 10 and restrict the set of basic elements to {0, 1}. Under this relatively mild restriction on the admissible semimeasures µ, it turns out that we can use the universal semimeasure M as a "universal prior" (replacing the real prior µ) for prediction. The theory of the universal semimeasure M, the analogue in the sample space {0, 1} ∞ of m in the sample space {0, 1} * equivalent to N , is developed in [17] , Chapter 4, and Chapter 5. It is defined with respect to a special type Turing machine called monotone Turing machine. The universal semimeasure M multiplicatively dominates all enumerable (Definition 10, Appendix B) semimeasures. It can be shown that if we flip a fair coin to generate the successive bits on the input tape of the universal reference monotone Turing machine, then the probability that it outputs xα (x followed by something) is M(x), [34] .
The universal probability M(·) allows us to explicitly express a universal randomness test for the elements in {0, 1} ∞ analogous to the universal randomness tests for the finite elements of {0, 1} * developed in Appendix C. This notion of randomness with respect to a recursive semimeasure µ satisfies the following explicit characterization of a universal (sequential) randomness test (for proof see [17] , Chapter 4):
and the set of µ-random sequences has µ-measure one,
In contrast with the discrete case, the elements of {0, 1} ∞ can be sharply divided in the random ones that pass all effective (sequential) randomness tests and the nonrandom ones that do not. We start by demonstrating convergence of M(y|x) and µ(y|x) for x → ∞, with µ-probability 1. 11 10 there is a Turing machine that for every x and b computes µ(x) within precision 2 −b . 11 We can express the "goodness" of predictions according to M with respect to a true µ as follows: Let Sn be the µ-expected value of the square of the difference in µ-probability and M-probability of 0 occurring at the nth
We may call Sn the expected squared error at the nth prediction. The following celebrated result of Solomonoff, [26] , says that M is very suitable for prediction (a proof using Kulback-Leibler divergence is given in [17] ):
Theorem 6 Let µ be a recursive semimeasure. Using the notation above, n Sn ≤ k/2 with k = K(µ) ln 2. (Hence, Sn converges to 0 faster than 1/n.) However, Solomonoff's result is not strong enough to give the required convergence of conditional probabilities with µ-probability 1.
Theorem 7 Let µ be a positive recursive measure. If the length of y is fixed and the length of x grows to infinity, then
with µ-probability one. The infinite sequences ω with prefixes x satisfying the displayed asymptotics are precisely the µ-random sequences.
Proof. We use an approach based on the Submartingale Convergence Theorem, [8] pp. 324-325, which states that the following property holds for each sequence of random variables ω 1 , ω 2 , . . .. If f (ω 1:n ) is a µ-submartingale, and the µ-expectation E|f (ω 1:n )| < ∞, then it follows that lim n→∞ f (ω 1:n ) exists with µ-probability one.
In our case,
is a µ-submartingale, and the µ-expectation Et(ω 1:n |µ) ≤ 1. Therefore, there is a set A ⊆ {0, 1} ∞ with µ(A) = 1, such that for each ω ∈ A the limit lim n→∞ t(ω 1:n |µ) < ∞. These are the µ-random ω's by Corollary 4.5.5 in [17] . Consequently, for fixed m, for each ω in A, we have The universal distribution combines a weighted version of the predictions of all enumerable semimeasures, including the prediction of the semimeasure with the shortest program. It is not a priori clear that the shortest program dominates in all cases-and as we shall see it does not. However, we show that in the overwhelming majority of cases-the typical cases-the shortest program dominates sufficiently to use shortest programs for prediction. Taking the negative logarithm on both sides of (18), we want to determine y with l(y) = n that minimizes − log µ(y|x) = − log µ(xy) + log µ(x).
This y is the most probable extrapolation of x.
Definition 7 Let U be the reference monotone machine. The complexity Km, called monotone complexity, is defined as
We omit the Invariance Theorem for Km complexity, stated and proven completely analogous to the Theorems with respect to the C and K varieties.
Theorem 8 Let µ be a recursive semimeasure, and let ω be a µ-random infinite binary sequence and xy be a finite prefix of ω. For l(x) grows unboundedly and l(y) fixed,
where Km(xy) and Km(x) grow unboundedly.
Proof. By definition, − log M(x) ≤ Km(x) since the left-hand side of the inequality weighs the probability of all programs that produce x while the right-hand side weighs the probability of the shortest program only. In the discrete case we have the Coding Theorem 2: [15] erroneously conjectured that also Km(x) + = − log M(x). But P. Gács [10] showed that they are different, although the differences must in some sense be very small:
However, for a priori almost all infinite sequences x, the difference between Km(·) and − log M(·) is bounded by a constant [10] :
There exists a function f (n) which goes to infinity with n → ∞ such that Km(x) + log M(x) ≥ f (l(x)), for infinitely many x. If x is a finite binary string, then we can choose f (n) as the inverse of some version of Ackermann's function Let ω be a µ-random infinite binary sequence and xy be a finite prefix of ω. For l(x) grows unboundedly with l(y) fixed, we have by Theorem 7:
Therefore, if x and y satisfy above conditions, then maximizing µ(y|x) over y means minimizing − log M(y|x). It is shown in Claim 4 that − log M(x) is slightly smaller than Km(x), the length of the shortest program for x on the reference universal monotonic machine. For binary programs this difference is very small, Claim 3, but can be unbounded in the length of x. Together this shows the following. Given xy that is a prefix of a (possibly not µ-random) ω, optimal prediction of fixed length extrapolation y from an unboundedly growing prefix x of ω need not necessarily be achieved by the shortest programs for xy and x minimizing Km(xy) − Km(x), but is achieved by considering the weighted version of all programs for xy and x which is represented by − log M(xy) + log M(x) = (Km(xy) − g(xy)) − (Km(x) − g(x)).
Here g(x) is a function which can rise to in between the inverse of the Ackermann function and Km(l(x)) ≤ log log x-but only in case x is not µ-random.
Therefore, for certain x and y which are not µ-random, optimization using the minimum length programs may result in incorrect predictions. For µ-random x we have that − log M(x) and Km(x) coincide up to an additional constant independent of x, that is, g(xy) = g(x) + = 0, Claim 4. Hence, together with Equation 20, the theorem is proven.
2
By its definition Km is monotone in the sense that always Km(xy) − Km(x) ≥ 0. The closer this difference is to zero, the better the shortest effective monotone program for x is also a shortest effective monotone program for xy and hence predicts y given x. Therefore, for all large enough µ-random x, predicting by determining y which minimizes the difference of the minimum program lengths of xy and x gives a good prediction. Here y should be preferably large enough to eliminate the influence of the O(1) term. 
Conclusion
The analysis of both hypothesis identification by ideal MDL and prediction shows that maximally compressed descriptions give good results on the data samples which are random with respect to probabilistic hypotheses. These data samples form the overwhelming majority and occur with probability going to one when the length of the data sample grows unboundedly. prefix of the other. A prefix-free set is also called a prefix code. Each binary string x = x 1 x 2 . . . x n has a special type of prefix code, called a self-delimiting code,
where ¬x n = 0 if x n = 1 and ¬x n = 1 otherwise. This code is self-delimiting because we can determine where the code wordx ends by reading it from left to right without backing up. Using this code we define the standard self-delimiting code for x to be x ′ = l(x)x. It is easy to check that l(x) = 2n and l(x ′ ) = n + 2 log n.
Let T 1 , T 2 , . . . be a standard enumeration of all Turing machines, and let φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . be the enumeration of corresponding functions which are computed by the respective Turing machines. That is, T i computes φ i . These functions are the partial recursive functions or computable functions. The Kolmogorov complexity C(x) of x is the length of the shortest binary program from which x is computed. Formally, we define this as follows.
Definition 8
The Kolmogorov complexity of x given y (for free on a special input tape) is
Though defined in terms of a particular machine model, the Kolmogorov complexity is machineindependent up to an additive constant and acquires an asymptotically universal and absolute character through Church's thesis, from the ability of universal machines to simulate one another and execute any effective process. The Kolmogorov complexity of an object can be viewed as an absolute and objective quantification of the amount of information in it. This leads to a theory of absolute information contents of individual objects in contrast to classic information theory which deals with average information to communicate objects produced by a random source [17] .
For technical reasons we also need a variant of complexity, so-called prefix complexity, which associated with Turing machines for which the set of programs resulting in a halting computation is prefix free. We can realize this by equiping the Turing machine with a one-way input tape, a separate work tape, and a one-way output tape. Such Turing machines are called prefix machines since the halting programs for anyone of them form a prefix free set. Taking the universal prefix machine U we can define the prefix complexity analogously with the plain Kolmogorov complexity. If x * is the first shortest program for x then the set {x * : U (x * ) = x, x ∈ {0, 1} * } is a prefix code. That is, each x * is a code word for some x, and if x * and y * are code words for x and y with x = y then x * is not a prefix of x.
Let · be a standard invertible effective one-one encoding from N × N to prefix-free recursive subset of N . For example, we can set x, y = x ′ y ′ . We insist on prefix-freeness and recursiveness because we want a universal Turing machine to be able to read an image under · from left to right and determine where it ends.
Definition 9
The prefix Kolmogorov complexity of x given y (for free) is
The nice thing about K(x) is that we can interpret 2 −K(x) as a probability distribution. Namely, K(x) is the length of a shortest prefix-free program for x. By the fundamental Kraft's inequality, see for example [5, 17] , we know that if l 1 , l 2 , . . . are the code-word lengths of a prefix code, then x 2 −lx ≤ 1. This leads to the notion of universal distribution-a rigorous form of Occam's razorbelow.
B Appendix: Universal Distribution
A Turing machine T computes a function on the natural numbers. However, we can also consider the computation of real valued functions. For this purpose we consider both the argument of φ and the value of φ as a pair of natural numbers according to the standard pairing function · . We define a function from N to the reals R by a Turing machine T computing a function φ as follows. Interprete the computation φ( x, t ) = p, q to mean that the quotient p/q is the rational valued tth approxmation of f (x).
Definition 10 A function f : N → R is enumerable if there is a Turing machine T computing a total function φ such that φ(x, t + 1) ≥ φ(x, t) and lim t→∞ φ(x, t) = f (x). This means that f can be computably approximated from below. If f can also be computably approximated from above then we call f recursive.
(The inequality is a technical convenience. We can consider the surplus probability to be concentrated on the undefined element u ∈ N ).
Consider the family EP of enumerable probability distributions on the sample space N (equivalently, {0, 1} * ). It is known, [17] , that EP contains an element m that multiplicatively dominates all elements of EP. That is, for each P ∈ EP there is a constant c such that c m(x) > P (x) for all x ∈ N . We call m a universal distribution.
The family EP contains all distributions with computable parameters which have a name, or in which we could conceivably be interested, or which have ever been considered. The dominating property means that m assigns at least as much probability to each object as any other distribution in the family EP does. In this sense it is a universal a priori by accounting for maximal ignorance. It turns out that if the true a priori distribution in Bayes's rule is recursive, then using the single distribution m, or its continuous analogue the measure M on the sample space {0, 1} ∞ (Section 3), is provably as good as using the true a priori distribution.
We also know, [16, 9, 6] , that
That means that m assigns high probability to simple objects and low probability to complex or random objects. For example, for x = 00 . . . 0 (n 0's) we have K(x) + = K(n) + < log n + 2 log log n since the program print n times a ''0'' prints x. (The additional 2 log log n term is the penalty term for a self-delimiting encoding.) Then, 1/(n log 2 n) = O(m(x)). But if we flip a coin to obtain a string y of n bits, then with overwhelming probability K(y) + > n (because y does not contain effective regularities which allow compression), and hence m(y) = O(1/2 n ).
C Appendix: Randomness Tests
One can consider those objects as nonrandom in which one can find sufficiently many regularities. In other words, we would like to identify "incompressibility" with "randomness." This is proper if the sequences that are incompressible can be shown to possess the various properties of randomness (stochasticity) known from the theory of probability. That this is possible is the substance of the celebrated theory developed by the Swedish mathematician Per Martin-Löf [18] . This theory was further elaborated in [34, 24, 14] and later papers.
There are many properties known which probability theory attributes to random objects. To give an example, consider sequences of n tosses with a fair coin. Each sequence of n zeros and ones is equiprobable as an outcome: its probability is 2 −n . If such a sequence is to be random in the sense of a proposed new definition, then the number of ones in x should be near to n/2, the number of occurrences of blocks "00" should be close to n/4, and so on.
It is not difficult to show that each such single property separately holds for all incompressible binary strings. But we want to demonstrate that incompressibility implies all conceivable effectively testable properties of randomness (both the known ones and the as yet unknown ones). This way, the various theorems in probability theory about random sequences carry over automatically to incompressible sequences.
In the case of finite strings we cannot hope to distinguish sharply between random and nonrandom strings. For instance, considering the set of binary strings of a fixed length, it would not be natural to to fix an m and call a string with m zeros random and a string with m + 1 zeros nonrandom.
Let us borrow some ideas from statistics. We are given a certain sample space S with an associated distribution P . Given an element x of the sample space, we want to test the hypothesis "x is a typical outcome." Practically speaking, the property of being typical is the property of belonging to any reasonable majority. In choosing an object at random, we have confidence that this object will fall precisely in the intersection of all such majorities. The latter condition we identify with x being random.
To ascertain whether a given element of the sample space belongs to a particular reasonable majority we introduce the notion of a test. Generally, a test is given by a prescription which, for every level of significance ǫ, tells us for what elements x of S the hypothesis "x belongs to majority M in S" should be rejected, where ǫ = 1 − P (M ). Taking ǫ = 2 −m , m = 1, 2, . . ., this amounts to saying that we have a description of the set V ⊆ N × S of nested critical regions
The condition that V m be a critical region on the significance level ǫ = 2 −m amounts to requiring, for all n
The complement of a critical region V m is called the (1 − ǫ) confidence interval. If x ∈ V m , then the hypothesis "x belongs to majority M ," and therefore the stronger hypothesis "x is random," is rejected with significance level ǫ. We can say that x fails the test at the level of critical region V m .
Example 6 A string x 1 x 2 . . . x n with many initial zeros is not very random. We can test this aspect as follows. The special test V has critical regions V 1 , V 2 , . . .. Consider x = 0.x 1 x 2 . . . x n as a rational number, and each critical region as a half-open interval V m = [0, 2 −m ) in [0, 1), m = 1, 2, . . .. Then the subsequent critical regions test the hypothesis "x is random" by considering the subsequent digits in the binary expansion of x. We reject the hypothesis on the significance level ǫ = 2 −m provided
Example 7 Another test for randomness of finite binary strings rejects when the relative frequency of ones differs too much from 1/2. This particular test can be implemented by rejecting the hypothesis of randomness of x = x 1 x 2 . . . x n at level ǫ = 2 −m provided |2f n − n| > g(n, m), where f n = n i=1 x i , and g(n, m) is the least number determined by the requirement that the number of binary strings x of length n for which this inequality holds is at most 2 n−m .
In practice, statistical tests are effective prescriptions such that we can compute, at each level of significance, for what strings the associated hypothesis should be rejected. It would be hard to imagine what use it would be in statistics to have tests that are not effective in the sense of computability theory.
Definition 11 Let P be a recursive probability distribution on the sample space N . A total function δ : N → N is a P -test (Martin-Löf test for randomness) if: A particularly important case is P is the uniform distribution, defined by L(x) = 2 −2l(x) . The restriction of L to strings of length n is defined by L n (x) = 2 −n for l(x) = n and 0 otherwise. (By definition, L n (x) = L(x|l(x) = n).) Then, Item 2 can be rewritten as x∈Vm L n (x) ≤ 2 −m which is the same as
In this case we often speak simply of a test, with the uniform distribution L understood.
In statistical tests membership of (m, x) in V can usually be determined in polynomial time in l(m) + l(x). Definition 12 A universal Martin-Löf test for randomness with respect to distribution P , a universal P-test for short, is a test δ 0 (·|P ) such that for each P -test δ, there is a constant c, such that for all x, we have δ 0 (x|P ) ≥ δ(x) − c.
We say that δ 0 (·|P ) (additively) majorizes δ. Intuitively, δ 0 (·|P ) constitutes a test for randomness which incorporates all particular tests δ in a single test. No test for randomness δ other than δ 0 (·|P ) can discover more than a constant amount more deficiency of randomness in any string x. In terms of critical regions, a universal test is a test such that if a binary sequence is random with respect to that test, then it is random with respect to any conceivable test, neglecting a change in significance level. Namely, with δ 0 (·|P ) a universal P -test, let U = {(m, x) : δ 0 (x|P ) ≥ m}, and, for any test δ, let V = {(m, x) : δ(x) ≥ m}. Then, defining the associated critical zones as before, we find
where c is a constant (dependent only on U and V ).
It is a major result that there exists a universal P -test. The proof goes by first showing that the set of all tests is enumerable.
Lemma 3
We can effectively enumerate all P -tests.
Proof. We start with the standard enumeration φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . of partial recursive functions from N into N × N , and turn this into an enumeration δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . of all and only P -tests. The list φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . enumerates all and only recursively enumerable sets of pairs of integers as {φ i (x) : x ≥ 1} for i = 1, 2, . . . In particular, for any P -test δ, the set {(m, x) : δ(x) ≥ m} occurs in this list. The only thing we have to do is to eliminate those φ i of which the range does not correspond to a P -test.
First, we effectively modify each φ (we drop the subscript for convenience) to a function ψ such that range φ equals range ψ, and ψ has the special property that if ψ(n) is defined, then ψ(1), ψ(2), . . . , ψ(n − 1) are also defined. This can be done by dovetailing the computations of φ on the different arguments: in the first phase do one step of the computation of φ(1), in the second phase do the second step of the computation of φ(1) and the first step of the computation of φ(2). In general, in the nth phase we execute the n 1 th step of the computation of φ(n 2 ), for all n 1 , n 2 satisfying n 1 + n 2 = n. We now define ψ as follows. If the first computation that halts is that of φ(i), then set ψ(1) := φ(i). If the second computation that halts is that of φ(j), then set ψ(2) := φ(j), and so on.
Secondly, use each ψ to construct a test δ by approximation from below. In the algorithm, at each stage of the computation the local variable array δ(1 : ∞) contains the current approximation to the list of function values δ(1), δ(2), . . .. This is doable because the nonzero part of the approximation is always finite.
Step 1 Initialize δ by setting δ(x) := 0 for all x. {If the range of ψ is empty, then this assignment will not be changed in the remainder of the procedure. That is, δ stays identically zero and it is trivially a test.} Initialize i := 0.
Step 2 Set i := i + 1; compute ψ(i) and let its value be (x, m).
Step 3 If δ(x) ≥ m then go to Step 2. else set δ(x) := m.
Step 4 If {P (y) : δ(y) ≥ k, l(y) = l(x)} > 2 −k for some k, k = 1, . . . , m {since P is a recursive function we can effectively test whether the new value of δ(x) violates Definition 12} then set δ(x) := 0 and terminate {the computation of δ is finished} else go to Step 2.
(With P the uniform distribution, for i = 1 the conditional in Step 4 simplifies to m > l(x).) In case the range of ψ is already a test, then the algorithm never finishes but forever approximates δ from below. If ψ diverges for some argument then the computation goes on forever and does not change δ any more. The resulting δ is an enumerable test. If the range of ψ is not a test, then at some point the conditional in Step 4 is violated and the approximation of δ terminates. The resulting δ is a test, even a recursive one. Executing this procedure on all functions in the list φ 1 , φ 2 , . . ., we obtain an effective enumeration δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . of all P -tests (and only P -tests). We are now in the position to define a universal P -test.
Proof. Note first that δ 0 (·|P ) is a total function on N because of Item 2 in Definition 12.
(1) The enumeration δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . in Lemma 3 yields an enumeration of recursively enumerable sets:
(2) Let us verify that the critical regions are small enough: for each n,
(3) By its definition, δ 0 (·|P ) majorizes each δ additively. Hence, it is universal. 2
By definition of δ 0 (·|P ) as a universal P -test, any particular P -test δ can discover at most a constant amount more regularity in a sequence x than does δ 0 (·|P ), in the sense that for each δ y we have δ y (x) ≤ δ 0 (x|P )) + y for all x.
For any two universal P -tests δ 0 (·|P ) and δ ′ 0 (·|P ), there is a constant c ≥ 0, such that for all x, we have |δ 0 (x|P ) − δ ′ 0 (x|P )| ≤ c. We started out with the objective to establish in what sense incompressible strings may be called random.
Proof. (1) We first show that f (x) is a test with respect to the uniform distribution. The set {(m, x) : f (x) ≥ m} is recursively enumerable since C() can be approximated from above by a recursive process.
(2) We verify the condition on the critical regions. Since the number of x's with C(x|l(x)) ≤ l(x) − m − 1 cannot exceed the number of programs of length at most l(x) − m − 1, we have
(3) We show that for each test δ, there is a constant c, such that f (x) ≥ δ(x) − c. The main idea is to bound C(x|l(x)) by exhibiting a description of x, given l(x). Fix x. Let the set A be defined as
We have defined A such that x ∈ A and d(A) ≤ 2 l(x)−δ(x) . Let δ = δ y in the standard enumeration δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . of tests. Given y, l(x), and δ(x), we can enumerate all elements of A. Together with x's index j in enumeration order of A, this suffices to find x. We pad the standard binary representation of j with nonsignificant zeros to a string s = 00 . . . 0j of length l(x) − δ(x). This is possible since l(s) ≥ l(d(A)). The purpose of changing j to s is that now the number δ(x) can be deduced from l(s) and l(x). In particular, there is a Turing machine which computes x from inputȳs, when l(x) is given for free. Consequently, since C() is the shortest effective description, C(x|l(x)) ≤ l(x) − δ(x) + 2l(y) + 1. Since y is a constant depending only on δ, we can set c = 2l(y) + 2. 2
In Theorem 9, we have exhibited a universal P -test for randomness of a string x of length n with respect to an arbitrary recursive distribution P over the sample set S = B n with B = {0, 1}.
The universal P -test measures how justified is the assumption that x is the outcome of an experiment with distribution P . We now use m to investigate alternative characterizations of random elements of the sample set S = B * (equivalently, S = N ).
Definition 13 Let P be a recursive probability distribution on N . A sum P -test is a nonnegative enumerable function δ satisfying
A universal sum P -test is a test that additively dominates each sum P -test.
The sum tests of Definition 13 are slightly stronger than the tests according to Martin-Löf's original Definition 11.
Lemma 4 Each sum P -test is a P -test. If δ(x)
is a P -test, then there is a constant c such that δ ′ (x) = δ(x) − 2 log δ(x) − c is a sum P -test.
Proof. It follows immediately from the new definition that for all n {P (x) : δ(x) > k, l(x) = n} ≤ 2 −k .
Namely, if (23) is false, then we contradict (22) by
Conversely, if δ(x) satisfies (23) for all n, then for some constant c, the function δ(x)−2 log δ(x)− c satisfies (22) . 2
This shows that the sum test is not much stronger than the original test. One advantage of (22) is that it is just one inequality, instead of infinitely many, one for each n. We give an exact expression for a universal sum P -test in terms of complexity.
Theorem 11 Let P be a recursive probability distribution. The function κ 0 (x|P ) = log(m(x)/P (x)) is a universal sum P -test.
Proof. Since m is enumerable, and P is recursive, κ 0 (x|P ) is enumerable. We first show that κ 0 (x|P ) is a sum P -test:
It is only left to show that κ 0 (x|P ) additively dominates all sum P -tests. For each sum P -test δ, the function P (x)2 δ(x) is a semimeasure that is enumerable. It has been shown, Section A, that there is a positive constant c such that c · m(x) ≥ P (x)2 δ(x) . Hence, there is another constant c such that c · κ 0 (x|P ) ≥ δ(x), for all x. 2
Example 9 An important case is as follows. If we consider a distribution P restricted to a domain A ⊂ N , then the universal sum P -test becomes log(m(x|A)/P (x|A)). For example, if L n is the uniform distribution on A = {0, 1} n , then the universal sum L n -test for x ∈ A becomes κ 0 (x|L n ) = log(m(x|A)/L n (x))
Namely, L n (x) = 1/2 n and log m(x|A) = −K(x|A) by the Coding Theorem, Section A. where we can describe A by giving n. 3
Example 10 The Noiseless Coding Theorem states that the Shannon-Fano code, which codes a source word x straightforwardly as a word of about − log P (x) bits, Section A, nearly achieves the optimal expected code word length. This code is uniform in the sense that it does not use any characteristics of x itself to associate a code word with a source word x. The code that codes each source word x as a code word of length K(x) also achieves the optimal expected code word length. This code is nonuniform in that it uses characteristics of individual x's to obtain shorter code words. Any difference in code word length between these two encodings for a particular object x can only be due to exploitation of the individual regularities in x.
Define the randomness deficiency of a finite object x with respect to P as −⌊log P (x)⌋ − K(x) + = − log P (x) + log m(x)
by the major theorems in Section C. That is, the randomness deficiency is the outcome of the universal sum P -test of Theorem 11. 3
Example 11 Let us compare the randomness deficiency as measured by κ 0 (x|P ) with that measured by the universal test δ 0 (x), for the uniform distribution. That test consisted actually of tests for a whole family L n of distributions, where L n is the uniform distribution such that each L n (x) = 2 −n for l(x) = n, and zero otherwise. Rewrite δ 0 (x) as δ 0 (x|L n ) = n − C(x|n), for l(x) = n, and ∞ otherwise. This is close to the expression for κ 0 (x|L n ) obtained in Example 9. ¿From the relations between C and K in [17] it follows that |δ 0 (x|L n ) − κ 0 (x|L n )| + < 2 log C(x).
The formulation of the universal sum test in Theorem 11 can be interpreted as follows. An element x is random with respect to distribution P , that is, κ 0 (x|P ) + =, if P (x) is large enough, not in absolute value but relative to m(x). If we did not have this relativization, then we would not be able to distinguish between random and nonrandom outcomes for the uniform distribution L n (x) above.
Let us look at an example. Let x = 00 . . . 0 of length n. Then, κ 0 (x|L n )
If we flip a coin n times to generate y, then with overwhelming probability K(y|n) ≥ n and κ 0 (y|L n ) = O(1).
Example 12 According to modern physics, electrons, neutrons and protons satisfy the Fermi-Dirac distribution. We distribute n particles among k cells, for n ≤ k, such that each cell is occupied by at most one particle; and all distinguished arrangements satisfying this have the same probability. We can treat each arrangement as a binary string: an empty cell is a zero and a cell with a particle is a one. Since there are k n possible arrangements, the probability for each arrangement x to happen, under the Fermi-Dirac distribution, is FD n,k (x) = k n −1 . According to Theorem 11: κ 0 (x|FD n,k ) = log(m(x|k, n)/FD n,k (x)) + = −K(x|n, k) + log k n is a universal sum test with respect to the Fermi-Dirac distribution. It is easy to see that a binary string x of length k with n ones has complexity K(x|n, k) ≤ log k n , and K(x|n, k) + > log k n for most such x. Hence, a string x with maximal K(x|n, k) will pass this universal sum test. Each individual such string possesses all effectively testable properties of typical strings under the FermiDirac distribution. Hence, in the limit for n and k growing unboundedly, we cannot effectively distinguish one such a string from other such strings.
Example 13 Markov's Inequality says the following. Let P be any probability distribution, f any nonnegative function with P -expected value E = x P (x)f (x) < ∞. For E ≥ 0 we have {P (x) : f (x)/E > k} < 1/k.
Let P be any probability distribution (not necessarily recursive). The P -expected value of m(x)/P (x) is 
Since m dominates all enumerable semimeasures multiplicatively, we have for all x, P (x) ≤ c P m(x), and it can be shown c P = 2 K(P ) .
Equations (24, 25) have the following consequences.
1. If x is a random sample from a simple recursive distribution P , where "simple" means that K(P ) is small, then m is a good estimate for P . For instance, if x is randomly drawn from distribution P , then the probability that c −1
is at least 1 − 1/c P .
2. If we know or believe that x is random with respect to P , and we know P (x), then we can use P (x) as an estimate of m(x).
In both cases the degree of approximation depends on the index of P , and the randomness of x with respect to P , as measured by the randomness deficiency κ 0 (x|P ) = log(m(x)/P (x)). For example, the uniform discrete distribution on B * can be defined by L(x) = 2 −2l(x) . Then, for each n we have L n (x) = L(x|l(x) = n). To describe L takes O(1) bits, and therefore κ 0 (x|L)
The randomness deficiency κ 0 (x|L)
, that is, iff x is random. The nonrecursive "distribution" m(x) = 2 −K(x) has the remarkable property that the test κ 0 (x|m) + = 0 for all x: the test shows all outcomes x random with respect to it. We can interpret (24, 25) as saying that if the real distribution is P , then P (x) and m(x) are close to each other with large P -probability. Therefore, if x comes from some unknown recursive distribution P , then we can use m(x) as an estimate for P (x). In other words, m(x) can be viewed as the universal a priori probability' of x.
The universal sum P -test κ 0 (x|P ) can be interpreted in the framework of hypothesis testing as the likelihood ratio between hypothesis P and the fixed alternative hypothesis m. In ordinary statistical hypothesis testing, some properties of an unknown distribution P are taken for granted, and the role of the universal test can probably be reduced to some tests that are used in statistical practice.
